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1. Introduction 
Since tariffs have been decreasing, more attention has been paid to non-tariff barriers (NTBs), or 
as more recently called, non-tariff measures (NTMs). Due to their intrinsic heterogeneity, 
NTBs/NTMs are categorized into several relatively more homogeneous subgroups (Harrigan 
(1993); Deardorff and Stern (1998); Haveman, Nair-Reichert, and Thursby (2003); and 
Fontagné, Mayer, and Zignago (2005)). Health and safety measures and technical standards, 
comprising Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), 
and other standard-like policies are often distinguished from other NTMs and their controversial 
effects on trade have been extensively analyzed. Ganslandt and Markusen (2001) explain how 
standards and technical regulations have both the trade-impeding effects by raising the costs of 
exporters and similar demand-enhancing effects by certifying quality and safety to consumers. 
 Our paper focuses on these TBTs SPS and standard-like policies, which we label 
technical measures1, and which affect international trade through changing production costs 
and/or enhancing demand. Empirical knowledge on technical measures has proliferated rapidly 
since the early 1990s, especially with investigations based on gravity equations. The literature 
shows a wide range of estimated effects from significantly impeding trade to significantly 
promoting trade. These results are difficult to rationalize without further formal investigation 
which we tackle in this paper with a meta-analysis. For example, Otsuki et al. (2001a, 2001b), 
Wilson and Otsuki (2001), and Wilson et al. (2003) found that stricter Maximum Residue Levels 
(MRLs) on aflatoxin or drug residues impeded trade. Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2008) found 
positive trade effects of sanitary measures, and negative or insignificant impacts of phytosanitary 
and quality measures. Disdier et al. (2008b) showed negative or insignificant impacts of TBTs 
and SPS on agricultural and food aggregate trade. They also investigated 30 disaggregated 
                                                 
1Technical measures include TBTs, SPS and standard-like policies covered by MAST categories A through C. 
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industries at the HS2 aggregation level, and found that TBTs and SPS had positive effects for 8 
industries, insignificant effects for 12 industries, and negative effects for 10 industries. 
Disaggregated findings of Nardella and Boccaletti (2004), Fontagné et al. (2005), and others also 
reveal that the direction and the significance of the technical measures trade effects could vary 
significantly across product groups and trading partners. In sum, this rich evidence of both trade-
impeding and trade-enhancing effects of technical measures muddles their patterns, and creates a 
need for further rationalization.  
 The variations in findings are partly due to variations in their data samples, mostly 
variations in industry, country, and aggregation level, among other things. For example, Disdier 
et al. (2008b) found different TBTs and SPS trade effects for different exporters, and different 
industries. Beside the differences in data, variations in the trade effects may be caused by 
different forms of technical measures proxies, model specifications, and other methodology 
variations. Otsuki et al. (2001a, 2001b), Wilson and Otsuki (2001), and Wilson et al. (2003), use 
MRLs to proxy the strength of technical measures. MRLs enter the regression as numerical 
values, a straightforward and accurate measure of the technical measures of interest. However, in 
most cases, technical measures do not have direct numerical measurements, so proxies have to be 
constructed. Commonly used proxies of technical measures are dummy variables, ad valorem 
equivalent (ave) of the policies, frequency ratio, and count variables. Choices among these 
different proxies may lead to different estimates of trade effects of technical measures. Few 
researchers have tried and compared different proxies within their investigations (see Disdier et 
al. (2008b)), and most researchers only chose one. 
 Since the first foundation for gravity equations by Anderson (1979), advances in the 
specification of gravity equations have brought many variations and refinements. Empirical 
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studies follow different theoretical underpinnings to different extents, which could also lead to 
variations in the estimated impact of technical measures on trade. 
 Deardorff and Stern (1998), Bureau and Beghin (2001), Maskus et al. (2001) distill the 
earlier literature on technical measures and associated methodologies to measure these policies 
and their effects. The earlier prevailing methods are still dominant today but with substantial 
advances. The refined theory underlying gravity equations (Feenstra (2004)) and econometric 
estimation techniques address new issues, such as the treatment of zero trade flows.  In addition, 
in recent years, researchers tend to analyze technical-measure effects with disaggregated data 
and wider country and industry coverage.  
Our meta-analysis attempts to statistically explain the variations in estimated trade effects 
of technical measures, taking both data sampling and methodology differences into consideration. 
Meta-analysis provides a more objective and systematic assessment of the empirical results than 
narrative reviews do. It uses statistical methods to investigate underlying patterns, which might 
otherwise look complex, and help us understand the core determinants to the variations in 
available estimates of the impact of technical measures. 
 
2. Specifications of the Gravity Equation  
In its simplest and early formulation, the gravity equation says that trade volume between two 
countries is directly proportional to the product of the countries GDPs and the distance between 
these two countries. It takes the usual reduced form:  
0 1 2 3log log( ) log( )ij i j ij ijX Y Y Hα α α α ε= + + + + , (1)  
where ijX  is the value of trade from country i to country j. and i jY Y  are the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of country i  and country j . GDP is a proxy for production capacity in the 
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exporting country, which at a sectoral level would be the supply of the exporter for that sector. 
GDP in the importing country is motivated by demand considerations of a representative 
consumer. Variable ijH includes variables that authors choose to explain the bilateral trade flow, 
such as distance between trade partners. The choice of the variables to be included is context 
specific and depends on the problem of interest. Variable ε is the error term. 
 Many empirical applications of gravity equations are atheoretical. Researchers use 
equation (1) directly without specifying explicit underlying micro-foundations. This simple 
approach successfully explains trade flows but leaves the reader wanting for more 
conceptualization. Theoretical foundations eventually were spelled out. The gravity equation can 
be derived from a perfect competition model, monopolistic competition model, increasing return 
theories, or the Heckscher-Ohlin model, among others. Most derivations assume perfect 
specialization (Helpman (1987); Anderson (1979); and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003 and 
2004)). Each country produces its unique variety of goods and exports this unique variety to all 
other countries. This assumption greatly simplifies the price structure, as shown below (see 
Evenett and Keller (2002) for an attempt to relax the perfect specialization assumption).  
 Accounting for trade costs makes derivations and estimations of gravity equation more 
difficult, because of the different price effects induced by trade costs. To see this, we derive the 
gravity equation with trade costs, following mostly the notation of Feenstra (2004). Beside the 
assumption of perfect specialization across countries, we further assume each country only 
specializes in one unique good for simplicity. In a free trade world without transaction cost, each 
good has a unique price, which is the same across countries, so we could normalize all prices to 
one and greatly simplify the problem. However, in real world applications, we need to consider 
trade costs and the variation of prices over time; normalization only works for one year. Trade 
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costs generally include transportation costs, tariffs, costs related to NTBs, and other trade costs.  
Suppose ijp  is the price in country j of the product produced in country i , and ip  is the 
ex-factory price of the product produced in country i  before exports take place, that is, net of 
any trade costs. The aggregate trade cost factor associated with selling the product produced in 
country i in country j is denoted as ijT . Hence, we have ij ij ip T p= .  
With CES preferences, the representative consumer maximizes ( 1)/
1
( )
C
j ij
i
U c σ σ−
=
=∑  subject 
to 
1
C
j ij ij
i
Y p c
=
=∑ ,  where jU  is the utility for country j ; number C  is the total number of 
countries. Variable ijc is the consumption in country j of the good produced in country i . 
Multiplying ijc  by price pij provides the total value of country i’s  exports to country j, denoted 
as ijX = pij ijc . Aggregate income or GDP of country j , jY  is equal to the production value 
j j jY p y= , where jy is the output production in country j . Corresponding demand functions are 
( / ) ( / )jij ij j jc p P Y P
σ−= , with 
1/(1 )
(1 )
1
( )
C
j ij
i
P p
σ
σ
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  the overall price index in country j .
 Combining the latter with ijX = pij ijc , we have 
1( )ijij j
j
p
X Y
P
σ−= . 
We then substitute ij ij ip T p=  into the latter to obtain a gravity-like function   
1( )i ijij j
j
p T
X Y
P
σ−= . (2) 
 Total production (or GDP) of country i  does not appear in (2) as in (1). To further link (2) 
to the gravity equation, we slightly deviate from Feenstra (2004), which follows the symmetric 
trade costs assumption ( ij jiT T= ) of Anderson and von Wincoop (2003). We derive a more 
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general gravity expression, and then compare the implications of different restrictive 
assumptions or estimation methods such as normalization of prices and symmetric trade costs. 
The market-equilibrium condition 
1
C
i ij ij
j
y c T
=
=∑  says that production of good i  is equal to the 
sum of its demands over all destinations and inclusive of the resource cost associated with trade 
costs (expressed in units of good i ). It implies that i i iY p y= =
1
C
i ij ij
j
p c T
=
∑ .  Then we make use of 
ij ij ip T p=  to obtain Yi =
1
C
ij ij
j
c p
=
∑ . Substitute ( / ) ( / )ij ij j j jc p P Y Pσ−=  to get 
Yi = 1
1
( / )
C
i ij j j
j
p T P Yσ−
=
∑  . (3)  
Define the world GDP
1
C
W j
j
Y Y
=
= ∑ , and country i ’s share of world GDP /i i WY Yθ = . Divide both 
sides of (3) by WY  and define
1/(1 )
1
1
( / )
C
i i ij j j
j
P p T P
σ
σθ
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  to obtain 
 1( ) ii
w
YP
Y
σ − =1.  (3’)  
Apply (3’) to (2) to get  
1( )i j ijij
w j i
YY T
X
Y P P
σ−=  ,  (4) 
with /i i iP P p=  . In equation (4), variables jP  and iP  are called “multilateral resistance” terms. 
More specifically, jP  is an importer-specific function of overall distortions of prices on all 
exporters imposed by importer j through trade costs. iP
  is an exporter-specific function of 
overall distortions faced by exporter i in all destination markets. 
Taking the log of (4) provides a generalized expression of the traditional gravity equation 
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(1) under asymmetric cost, which explains the presence of jP and iP
 . Both indices depend on 
trade costs and price indexes of all the trading partners. This specification poses a problem for 
the empirical estimation, since it is hardly possible to take all trading partners into account. 
Anderson and von Wincoop (2003) assume symmetric trade costs, and get an implicit solution to 
the “multilateral resistance” term, which is similar to equating jP  and iP
  or to assuming ex- 
factory prices pi normalized to one. The symmetric trade costs assumption is unrealistic in most 
cases. To overcome this undesirable assumption, Harrigan (1996), Hummels (1999), Redding 
and Venables (2004), and Rose and van Wincoop (2001) introduced country fixed effects to 
account for jP  and iP
 . Feenstra (2004) tested the fixed effect method and Anderson and von 
Wincoop (2003) method, and found they did almost equally well.  
 To implement the derived gravity equation, one needs to choose a functional form for the 
trade costs. Authors usually choose multiplicative forms, such as 
1
( )
qQ q
ij ijq
T TC γ== Π , for simplicity, 
and variables TC often come from previous empirical findings and/or certain estimated trade 
costs the author is interested in. In practice, Variables TC typically include distances, tariffs, 
non-tariff barriers such as TBTs and SPS measures, and others. The estimated responses 
(1 )qγ σ−  are the coefficient of interest for our meta-analysis when they pertain to technical 
measures. 
 In our meta-analysis of the estimates of technical-measure trade effects, we explain the 
variations of these estimates by two classes of explanatory variables. One class captures the 
variations in the model specification and estimation techniques, and the other class captures the 
subpopulation variations. We elaborate on these two points next. 
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3. Meta Analysis 
We construct explanatory variables based on theoretical arguments as well as conjectures 
expressed in the literature regarding important matters explaining these estimated impacts. The 
objective is to control for the determinants that are most likely to matter. The limitation of the 
data also restricts the determinants we can investigate as collinearity arises from the multiplicity 
of categorical variables.  
3.1. Variations in estimation methods 
First, we look at classic errors in gravity estimations. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) pointed out 
three mistakes in gravity equations that could lead to biasness in gravity equation estimates: the 
“gold medal error”, “silver medal error,” and “bronze medal error.” The “gold medal error” 
refers to the failure to include the relative price terms, which are equivalent to jP  and iP
  in (4), 
derived above. The omission of jP  and iP
  causes the omitted trade cost variables in the error 
term to be correlated with the trade cost variables accounted for. As discussed in the gravity 
equation section, the “multilateral resistance term” or fixed effects approximating the term could 
correct this mistake.  
The “silver medal error” refers to the situation when researchers mistakenly use the 
logarithm of the average instead of the average of the logarithm of trade flows (average of 
exports and imports). The “bronze medal error” is caused by inappropriately deflating trade 
values using the same deflator, say the U.S. consumer price index, and the resulting “spurious” 
correlation from the common deflator causes biases. This error would be a problem for multi-
year data; time-series dummies could correct the biasness. In the meta-analysis, we use dummy 
variables to control for the presence or not of correction for “gold” and “bronze” errors, or more 
specifically, the inclusion of country fixed effects and/or time fixed effects used to estimate the 
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technical measure effects. However, as “silver errors” are extremely scarce in our sample of 
studies, we are not able to consider this category in our analysis. 
 Second, we consider the treatment of zero-trade flows in the collected investigations. 
Since the gravity equation takes a log-linear form, the zero trade observations pose a problem for 
the estimation and raise the issue of sample selection bias, among others. A commonly used 
technique is to drop the zero trade observations. But if zero trade is due to the missing values, 
rounding, or no trade, then dropping those observations could lead to bias. Several techniques 
exist to retain the zeros. A simple practice to deal with the zero-trade problem is to add a small 
arbitrary number to all trade values, and make the log of zero trade a negative value. This 
method is quite arbitrary and could lead to some bias although the direction of the bias is not 
clear. There are some important advances in this issue in recent years. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
suggested a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) technique to estimate the gravity 
equation in its multiplicative form and in levels instead of the commonly used log linear form. 
This technique naturally solves the numerical problem of zero trade  and is also robust to 
heteroskedasticity in errors. However, it could also be biased as predicted trade is positive with 
the exponential functional form. 
However, Martin and Pham (2008) show that the PPML method could also be seriously 
biased if zero trades are frequent. The zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model (Lambert, 1992) 
improves upon the PPML and is able to handle excess zeros. More specifically, the probability of 
having zero trade is estimated with a logit/probit, and the non-zero trade part is estimated with 
PPML. The Tobit model and the Heckman two-step model are other methods used to address 
zero trade observations. The choice between these two methods is mostly based on authors’ 
beliefs in the causes of zero trade observations. If zero trade is allegedly caused by censored 
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data, then it is appropriate to use Tobit model. On the other hand, if zero trade is suspected to be 
caused by decisions or self-selection, they may choose the Heckman two-stage procedure 
instead. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) (HMR hereafter) developed a novel modified 
two-stage estimation technique by accounting for firm heterogeneity and the extensive margin 
from new firms entering into export markets. Their approach enables the investigation of both 
intensive margin (existing trade) and extensive margin from new firms entering trade, hence 
differentiation between fixed and variable trade costs. 
However, due to the different popularity of procedures and limited availability of the 
studies, especially the relative scarcity of the studies based on PPML, ZIP, Tobit, Heckman two-
stage model or HMR, we can only attempt to distinguish the difference between groups of these 
econometric procedures (see Appendix A for the frequency table of different procedures). We 
tried three groupings based on our conjectures of their commonality. First, we controlled 
truncation (dropping zero data) versus other procedures. Second, we grouped modeling 
procedures that address zero data explicitly (ZIP, Tobit, Heckman two-stage, HMR) versus 
numerical accommodation of zero data (truncation, PPML, and adding small numbers). Third, 
we grouped PPML and adding small numbers based on the conjecture that they may cause bias 
from forcing level equation to accommodate zero data as small positive predicted or actual 
values. However, the dominant number of estimates from studies relying on truncation leads to 
similar meta-analysis estimation results2 between the first and second grouping (excluding or 
including PPML and adding small number procedure). Further, the third grouping is too skewed 
for MNL regression. To avoid ambiguity, we choose the first grouping and use a dummy variable, 
which equals zero if truncation is applied and equals one if zero data are treated with other 
procedures. 
                                                 
2  Estimation results for the second grouping are available upon request. 
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Third, endogeneity of the barriers to trade is another problem that might cause bias, since 
it is reasonable to argue that trade expands first and regulations, like TBTs, may come after as 
protectionism. Trefler (1993), and Lee and Swagel (1997) showed that the endogeneity problem 
could lead to the underestimation of NTMs’ impact on trade. Unfortunately, few studies in our 
sample addressed this problem directly. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) pointed out that a panel 
data approach could handle the endogeneity problem very well with panel data and fixed time 
effects. So we account when a paper uses panel data with time fixed effects as a way to address 
endogeneity. 
Fourth, the choice of technical measure proxy used in the investigations provides 
methodology variation which translates into a variation in data characteristics. Technical 
measure studies may differ in their choices of policy proxy measures: dummy variables for the 
existence of measures, count variable, frequency index, and ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) are 
commonly used. The literature has not settled yet on the best way to measure technical measures 
and which proxy measure is the best if any. For example, the AVE estimated by Kee et al. (2006) 
had some potential problems in its estimation procedures as it constrains NTMs effects to be 
trade restrictive and rules out trade expansion effects. Intuitively, the proxy choice could affect 
the variation in the estimates. Finally, quite of few studies based on panel data with time 
dimension, ignore the time variation in the TBT proxy. This omission may have some systematic 
impact on the trade effects, so we use a dummy to control whether the proxy exhibits time 
variation, provided that panel data was used. 
3.2. Subpopulation characteristics 
Data subpopulations used to estimate the effects of technical measures on trade differ by trading 
partners, industry coverage, and aggregation level. Trading-partner variations can be controlled 
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by the development status of exporters/importers. Further, trade effects could be significantly 
different across agricultural (sectors HS01-HS15 in the Harmonized System 2-digit level), 
processed food and beverage (HS16-HS25), and manufacturing products (HS26-HS99). In 
addition, in the context of North-South trade, we are interested to test the hypothesis that SPS 
regulations inhibit trade of agricultural products between developing exporters and developed 
importers rather than being catalyst of trade. This is an unsettled debate in the literature. 
Further, the sectoral aggregation level of the trade flow used in the investigations also 
matters for the size and variation of the trade effects (Hillberry (2002)). We use the digit of the 
Harmonized System (HS) indicating the aggregation level as the measure of aggregation level of 
the data. 2-digit HS, 4-digit HS, or 6-digit HS, measure the aggregation level takes values of 2, 4, 
and 6, respectively. The HS aggregation digit is an ordinal number, but for regression purpose, 
we use it as cardinal number to measure the disaggregation level with the usual limitations of 
doing so. The motivation is to limit the multiplicity of dummy variables compounding 
singularity issues in our investigation. 
 
4. Our Dataset of SPS/TBT Studies 
Our data set includes 27 papers that use gravity equations to estimate technical-measure effects 
on trade flows, and totals 618 observations. Table 1 lists the studies and the number of estimates 
collected from each study and the sector coverage. The selection of our studied sample is based 
on availability. We have performed extensive searches with Econlit, REPEC, SSRN, IATRC, 
Agecon Search, and other web-servers and working paper repositories completed by summer 
2009. 
 The first criterion used to select investigations is that the study investigates the trade 
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effects of technical measures. We focus on technical measures, rather than on all NTMs because 
“all NTMs” include all barriers but tariffs, and lack communality of effects on agents’ decisions. 
For example, many classifications of NTMs include macro policies, price control measures, 
quantity control measures, etc. (Deardorff and Stern (1998)). Too wide of a policy coverage 
would dilute the validity and precision of the meta-analysis, but too narrow of a coverage could 
lack generality on how technical measures are believed to affect international trade through 
changing production costs and/or enhancing demand through quality and information effects. 
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Table 1: The list of papers included and the number of estimates per paper 
Paper 
Index 
Author(s) # of 
Estimates 
Industry Coverage 
1 Disdier, Fontagné, Mimouni (2008) 38 Ag, Food, Manufacturing 
2 Wilson and Otsuki (2004) 2 Ag 
3 Disdier and Marette (2009) 2 Ag 
4 Olper and Raimondi (2008) 1 Food 
5 Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2008) 6 Ag, Food 
6 Nardella and Boccaletti (2004) 40 Ag, Food 
7 Wilson, Otsuki, and Majumdar (2003) 2 Ag 
8 Disdier, Fekadu, Murillo, and Wong (2008) 84 Ag, Food 
9 Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a) 2 Ag, Food 
10 Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001b) 3 Ag 
11 Wilson and Otsuki (2001) 3 Ag 
12 Disdier and Fontagné (2008) 46 Ag 
13 Chen, Yang, and Findlay (2008) 5 Ag 
14 Babool and Reed (2007) 1 Ag, Food 
15* Gebrehiwet, Naqangweni and Kirsten(2007) 2 Food 
16 Anders and Caswell(2006) 9 Ag 
17 Nguyen and Wilson (2009) 21 Ag 
18 Jayasinghe, Beghin, and Moschini (2009) 6 Ag 
19* Scheepers, Jooste, Alemu (2007) 1 Ag 
20 Nardella and Boccaletti (2003) 8 Ag, Food 
21 Nardella and Boccaletti (2003) 90 Ag, Food 
22 Fontagné, Mimouni, and Pasteels (2005) 182 Ag, Food, Manufacturing 
23 Chen, N (2004) 2 Food, Manufacturing 
24 Fontagné, Mayer, and Zignago (2005) 1 Food, Manufacturing 
25 Blind and Jungmittag (2005) 4 Ag, Food, Manufacturing 
26 Blind(2001) 4 Manufacturing 
27 Harrigan (1993) 56 Food, Manufacturing 
Total   618   
* Estimates are dropped because of missing sample size information 
The second criterion of our selection is that the empirical model used in the study has to 
be based on the gravity equation. Using the derived gravity equation (4) and including an explicit 
technical measure trade cost proxy variable, and then taking logarithm of both sides lead to: 
1 2
0 1 2log log( ) log( ) (1 ) (1 )ij i j i j ij ij ijX Y Y TM Hα α α α α γ σ γ σ ε= + + + + + − + − + ,  (4’)  
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where iα  and jα  correspond to the “multilateral resistance” terms iP  and iP . The coefficients of 
the log of GDPs are not always restricted to 1 in practice. The coefficient 1(1 )γ σ−  represents 
the impact of technical measures on trade flows (log | , , , ) /ij i j ij ij ijX Y Y TM H TM∂ ∂ . Given ijX and 
 TMij , the value of 
1(1 )γ σ− depends on the log linear form of ijX  as well as all the information 
upon which it is conditioned. We use explanatory variables which capture the variations in 
information from one study to the next. Hence, estimates from the same gravity model are 
comparable in a conceptual sense. 
In addition, papers in our sample differ from the ones that analyze the trade effects of 
harmonized or reciprocal technical measures as opposed to idiosyncratic measures (Moenius 
(2004, 2007a, 2007b); Blind (2001); Blind and Jungmittag (2005); and Swann et al. (1996)). The 
latter investigations of technical measures intend to gauge the impact of the harmonized 
technical measures as opposed to unilateral national measures. Papers in our sample studied the 
general technical measure impacts abstracting away from this complication of the potential 
impact of harmonized or reciprocal policies.  
 
6. Meta-Analysis 
Pooling the technical measure trade effects in a meta-analysis, we compare the trade effects of 
different polices or different proxies. Many policies are categorized as technical measures. 
Nardella and Boccaletti (2005), and Anders and Caswell (2006) estimated the impact of hazard 
analysis and critical control points on trade. Otsuki et al. (2001a, 2001b) investigated the trade 
effects of aflatoxin residue standards. In addition, researchers could use different technical 
measure proxy types (count of measures, dummies, AVEs, among others). One cannot represent 
these effects under a common metric such as elasticity as was done for distance elasticities in 
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Disdier and Head (2005). This heterogeneity of representations of TBTs creates a conundrum 
which we resolve as follows. 
 The estimates of different technical measure proxies have different scales and some are 
continuous, whereas others are dichotomous. One could think of categorical variables, 
classifying the available estimates into three sets (negative significant, insignificant, and positive 
significant, respectively). The latter classification corresponds to the barrier/catalyst view of 
TBT policies. In addition, one would like to preserve further information, like magnitude of 
estimates and significance levels which would be lost by just using categorical variables to 
pigeonhole the estimates. To achieve this, we use the t-values of the available technical measure 
estimates. The t-value, defined as the point estimate divided its standard error, is unit free, so we 
make the estimates comparable. By using t-values, we sacrifice the information on the magnitude 
of the effect but we keep the direction of the effect and the magnitude of the significance of the 
estimates. A positive coefficient on the right-hand side covariates in the meta-analysis means the 
explanatory variable has a trade enhancing effect (or less trade-impeding effect), and vice versa. 
 The basic meta analysis model is: 0
1
K
es kes es
k
k
t Zβ β μ
=
= + +∑ ,     (5) 
where est  is the t-value of the e-th estimate of the s-th study, kesZ  is the k-th explanatory variable 
used to capture the variation in characteristics of the studies. Note that we use multiple estimates 
from one study so as to keep as much variation and information as possible.  
Although we control for some important characteristics as stated above, there are more 
intrinsic differences among studies left in the error terms esμ . Thus, violations of normality, 
heteroskedasticity, outliers, and influential data points are likely to exist in our sample of studies. 
Therefore, we adopt a robust regression technique to deal with the unknown underlying 
distributions in addition to regular least squares. As we use multiple estimates from one study, 
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the estimates from the same study are likely to be correlated. Robust regression could also down- 
weight clusters, to prevent the study that provides more estimates from having unduly influence. 
We detect and down-weight outliers and influential data points by examining residuals and some 
influence statistics (i.e. Cook’s distances, DIFIT, etc). We do not delete them, however, to 
preserve data. Robust regression mitigates the problem of outliers and influential data points by 
down-weighting them, and makes the estimates more resistant to their influence (Belsley et al. 
(1980)). 
 In addition to the linear OLS and robust regression models, we employ a multinomial 
logit (MNL) model to help interpretation of results and we check their consistency with  the 
robust regression results. In the MNL approach we split the data into significantly negative 
estimates (t value smaller than -1.96), insignificant ones (t value comprised within (-1.96, 1.96)), 
and positively significant ones (t-value larger than 1.96). The approach is  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  = 
1
10 1
1
K
kes es
k
k
Zβ β μ
=
+ +∑ , 
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
= =
2
20 2
1
K
kes es
k
k
Zβ β μ
=
+ +∑  ,                (6) 
where D is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the corresponding ijt ≤ -1.96, equal to 2 if -1.96 < 
ijt < 1.96, and equal to 3 if ijt ≥1.96 . Each paper can be seen as a cluster, and we have multiple 
observations from each cluster and independent clusters. We use a robust estimator of the 
clustered error structure, assuming independence among clusters, but dependence among 
observations that are within the same cluster. The estimates from the MNL regression show the 
impact of the explanatory variables on log odds, not the impact on the probability of the 
categorical variable D. We normalize the probabilities ( Pr( 1) Pr( 2) Pr( 3) 1D D D= + = + = = ), to 
derive the conditional probabilities: 
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The associated marginal effects are: 
1
1 1 2 1 2 3( ( ) )k k kk
P P P P
Z
β β β∂ = + −∂ ,  
2
2 1 1 2 3( )k kk
P P P P
Z
β β∂ = − +∂ , and  (8) 
3
3 2 2 2 1 1( ( ) )k k kk
P P P P
Z
β β β∂ = + −∂ . 
Conditional probabilities and marginal effects all depend on all Z’s and β ’s, so we condition the 
interpretation on the latter evaluated at the mean of all Z’s. 
To summarize, the following variables are included in our meta-analysis specification: 
Fix_country_pair: a dummy variable, which equals 1if panel data and the model has country-pair 
fixed effects; Panel_fix_time: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if panel data and the model with 
time fixed effects; Panel_var_time: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if panel data and proxy 
has time variation; Zero_treated: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if zero-trade is treated with 
two-stage, Tobit, PPML, etc.; Ag: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the related products are 
agricultural products; Food: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the related products are 
processed food, beverage; Manu: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the related products are 
manufacturing products; dev_SPS: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if data refer to and 
developing exporters, and developed importers, and agricultural products affected by SPS 
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measures; Sample_centered: a number, the sample size of each study, centered at its mean 
14,172.53, and scaled by 10,000; Agg_hs_centered: a number, the # of  HS digits of the data, 
centered by the aggregation level 5.14 (average of the variable); Proxy_dummy: a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if the proxy of technical measures is a dummy variable; Proxy_count: a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 if the proxy of technical measures is a count variable; 
Proxy_freq: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the proxy of technical measures is a frequency 
or coverage ratio variable; a Proxy_mrl: dummy variable, which equals 1 if a maximum residue 
level (MRL) is used directly, or equivalently, if the related policy is a MRL; SPS_no_mrl: a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 if the related policy is SPS but not measured by a MRL; and 
TBT: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the related policy is a TBT. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics on how the collected observations are pigeonholed 
according to their characteristics, and the statistical significance and sign of their TBT estimates. 
Dummy variables capture the sample or model specification choices, and they are intrinsically 
uncorrelated. Unlike experimental data with the number of “controlled” observations and 
“experimental” observations perfectly balanced, for our observational data, we cannot control the 
“balance” of the data. In the first two columns of table 2, we check the balance of the data by 
calculating the number of papers and estimates corresponding to each dummy variable applied in 
the meta-analysis. For example, 21 out of 28 papers estimated trade effects in agricultural 
sectors, 13 out of 28 papers estimated trade effects in the food sector, and only 7 in 
manufacturing.  
Ideally, we would like the coverage to be more evenly distributed across sectoral 
activities. Similarly, the second column indicates the number of estimates for which a categorical 
variable is equal to 1. For example, 392 out of 618 estimates are estimated from the gravity 
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equations with country-pair fixed effects. Although we don’t have perfectly balanced data, the 
first two columns show that the data is not very skewed or unbalanced. As we estimate MNL 
model, every variable must have some variations within each category D=1, 2, 3. From the last 
three columns of table 2, variables Proxy_mrl and Panel_fix_time have no variations when D=3, 
so we exclude these two variables in the MNL model. 
Table 2: Summary statistics on the distribution of observations of categorical variables for 
D1 (negative significant), D2 (insignificant), and D3 (positive significant) 
Explanatory 
Variable in meta 
analysis 
Number of 
papers affected 
by exp. variable 
(dummy=1) 
Number of 
estimates 
for which 
dummy=1 
Breakdown 
for negative 
effects D=1
Breakdown 
for insig. 
effects D=2 
Breakdown 
for positive 
effects D=3
Fix_country_pair 13 392 101 242 49 
Panel_fix_time 7 73 49 24 0 
Panel_var_time 8 94 58 32 4 
Zero_treated 9 291 88 158 45 
Ag 21 347 144 159 45 
Food 15 192 77 84 29 
Manu 7 177 42 105 30 
dev_SPS 8 143 61 74 8 
Proxy_dummy 7 169 68 93 8 
Proxy_count 6 152 57 55 40 
Proxy_freq 5 241 53 155 33 
Proxy_mrl 10 20 18 2 0 
SPS_no_mrl 13 537 171 296 70 
TBT 14 451 116 267 68 
      
 
6. Estimation Steps and Results 
 We check the data for some potential collinearity as we have numerous dichotomous variables. 
If collinearity is a problem , it can confound our estimation. We use the conditioning index, 
variance inflation index (VIF), and variance-decompositions jointly to diagnose the multi-
collinearity problems in our sample (Belsley et al. (1980)). Practically, multicollinearity may be 
a serious problem when the conditioning index is greater than 30, the VIF is greater than 10, and 
variance-decomposition proportions for two or more estimated regression coefficient variances 
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are higher than 0.5.   
Diagnostic outputs (see Appendix B for details) suggest possible strong collinearity 
between the intercept, variable Proxy_mrl, variable SPS_no_mrl, and variable Proxy_count. 
Since Proxy_mrl has the least variation within the sample, we drop it to break the possible 
collinearity. Then we run the diagnostic procedure again (see Appendix B), possible strong 
collinearity emerges between variables Ag, Food, Manu. So we drop variable Manu, because it 
seems to have relative high VIF and low explanation power. Following this second step, the 
diagnostic output suggests no additional serious collinearity problem (see Appendix B for 
details). In addition, we informally check the stability of the regression results by sequentially 
dropping each variable (results reported in Appendix C), and we believe collinearity issues have 
been addressed successfully. 
 Table 3 presents the results from the OLS, the robust, and the MNL regressions with 
clustered error structure. In OLS and robust regressions, the dependent variable is the t-value of 
the estimated technical-measure trade effects. Although we preserve the most variations possible 
to make trade effects from different studies comparable, a major limitation of using t-values is 
the difficulty in interpreting the coefficients. The results tell us which variables have significant 
impacts on the t-values and the direction of the impacts, but we need to know the current t-value 
to say more.  
For example, given a negative coefficient of some variable, an increase in this variable 
makes the trade effects more negative significant or less positive significant, but we cannot tell 
whether it becomes negative significant, insignificant, or positive significant unless we have the 
current value of the t-value. The marginal effects are conditional on the current t-value. To 
facilitate the interpretation, we centered the sample size variable and aggregation level variable 
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at the mean of the dataset, 14172.53 and 5.14, respectively. So we can interpret the intercept of 
the linear regression as conditional mean of the t-value when sample size and aggregation level 
are at the sample mean, and all categorical variables equal zero. We interpret the coefficients of  
Table 3: Regression results  
Explanatory Var. OLS Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
(MNL) 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
   Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  
Marginal Effect of MNL 
(conditional on sample means) 
1
k
P
Z
∂
∂
            2
k
P
Z
∂
∂
          3
k
P
Z
∂
∂
 
Intercept -0.11 -0.11 1.88 0.56 0.4 -0.38 -0.02 
(1.12) (0.73) (1.21) (0.93) (0.27) (0.26) (0.08) 
Fix_country_pair 2.19*** 2.89*** -1.81** 0.17 -0.42** 0.33* 0.09* 
(0.72) (0.45) (0.83) (0.62) (0.18) (0.17) (0.05) 
Panel_fix_time -2.16** -1.79*** n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
(1.04) (0.66)      
Panel_var_time -1.16 -1.07* 1.68** -1.25* 0.44*** -0.23 -0.20*** 
(0.91) (0.57) (0.76) (0.70) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) 
Zero_treated -3.18*** -2.93*** 0.42 0.88** 0.06 -0.13 0.08* 
(0.57) (0.36) (0.43) (0.37) (0.10) (0.09) (0.04) 
Ag -0.86* -0.93*** 0.29 -1.03*** 0.11 0.01 -0.12*** 
(0.49) (0.31) (0.41) (0.24) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) 
Food -0.97* -1.18*** 0.68 -0.88** 0.19* -0.07 -0.12** 
(0.49) (0.31) (0.46) (0.44) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 
dev_SPS -3.56*** -2.53*** 1.03** 0.2 0.23** -0.20** -0.02 
(0.60) (0.38) (0.44) (0.58) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) 
Agg_hs_centered 0.73*** 0.56*** -0.1 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Sample_centered 0.05 -0.02 0.21** 0.26*** 0.04** -0.06** 0.02*** 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Proxy_dummy 2.95*** 1.74*** -2.22*** -2.09*** -0.42** 0.55*** -0.13* 
(0.87) (0.55) (0.82) (0.85) (0.19) (0.16) (0.08) 
Proxy_count 2.22** 2.12*** -2.27** 0.73 -0.55*** 0.38* 0.17*** 
(1.00) (0.63) (0.99) (0.76) (0.21) (0.21) (0.06) 
Proxy_freq 2.65*** 2.17*** -1.48** -1.97*** -0.26 0.40*** -0.15** 
(0.91) (0.58) (0.75) (0.60) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) 
SPS_no_mrl -1.13* -0.81** -0.48 -0.4 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 
(0.61) (0.39) (0.49) (0.40) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) 
TBT -0.55 -1.18*** -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
(0.64) (0.40) (0.64) (0.22) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) 
R2 0.24 0.16 0.17    
Observations 618 618 618    
*, **, *** denote the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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the variables as the impact on the t-values conditional on the t-value being equal to the intercept 
or the conditional sample mean described above. In addition, the MNL results help to sort out 
this issue as they provide estimated marginal effects. 
We use the MNL regression together with robust regression to obtain a more precise 
interpretation of the results. For the most part, robust regression results and MNL results agree. 
In a few cases, MNL results indicate insignificant marginal effects of some variable(s) whereas 
robust regression shows significant impact of the same variable(s). This is caused by the limited 
variation of categorical dependent variables and the limited number of observations from 
splitting the data set into three zones. We use a specific example (figure 1 and table 4) to 
illustrate the situation later. 
The variable Fix_country_pair controls for the correction of the “gold medal error.” 
Robust regression shows that including the correction makes the conditional mean of t-values 
more positive; MNL results show that the estimates in the literature with country-pair fixed 
effect are less likely to have negative significant technical measure trade effects, and more likely 
to have insignificant or positive significant technical measure trade effects than models estimated 
without the correction. The variable Panel_fix_time corresponds to the correction of the “bronze 
error” as well as the endogeneity of the technical measures. The results suggest that the latter 
correction makes the effects of technical measures more negative relative to the conditional 
average t-values.  Investigations with panel data and time variation (Panel_var_time) are more 
likely to have negative significant trade effects, and less likely to have insignificant and positive 
significant trade effects. Their t-values tend to be more negative. 
MNL results show that the treatment of zero-trade has a marginally small positive impact 
on the probability of getting positive estimates. However, the robust regression result seems to 
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contradict that of the MNL estimation because it shows the conditional mean of t-values 
becomes more negative by retaining zero-trade. This is a rare case where robust regression 
results do not agree with MNL results, and the possible reason could be the limited variation of 
the categorical dependent variables. We illustrate this issue in figure 1 and table 4 below. 
Figure1 shows that t-values are more closely clustered when zero trade is not treated, and 
t-values are more spread out in the negative range when zero trade is treated. Consequently, we 
have a negative significant coefficient for variable Zero_treated in the robust regression. 
Figure 1: t-value against zero_treated dummy variable (1=treated) 
 
Table 4: Frequency of variable zero_treated in each category D=1, 2, 3 
    Zero_treated    
D 
 0 1 Total 
1 121 88 209 
2 162 158 320 
3 44 45 89 
Total 327 291 618 
 
However, the relative position in the negative end of t-values is not shown in categorical 
variable D, because of its limited variation. Instead, the D=3 category has relative more 
observations (45 out of 291) when zero trade is treated, than when zero trade is not treated (44 
out of 327). Hence, the MNL regression results suggest that treating zero trade increase the 
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probability of having positive significant estimates. 
For agriculture (Ag) and processed food products (Food), the technical measure trade 
effects are less likely to be positive significant. We verify that the finding of SPS regulations 
having a trade impeding effect for agricultural products produced by developing exporters and 
going to developed importers is systematic. Both the robust regression and the MNL results 
show this effect to be significantly present. The result of interaction variable dev_SPS shows that 
the SPS trade effect from developing exporter to developed importer is more negatively affected 
and is most likely to be negatively significant, and less likely to be insignificant or positively 
significant. 
The aggregation level of the data (Agg_hs_centered) is highly significant in the robust 
regression but not in the MNL. The more disaggregated the trade data, the more positive 
significant are the trade effects from the conditional mean of the t-values. The larger datasets 
(Sample_centered) tend to bring more conclusive results on the trade effects of technical 
measures as shown by the MNL results. The probability to have significant trade effects (either 
positive or negative) increases with the sample size. Not surprisingly, the OLS and robust 
regressions cannot capture this result. 
Last and importantly, choosing the count proxy of technical measures (Proxy_count) is 
more likely to lead to positive or insignificant trade effects and less likely to have negative 
significant trade effects. Choosing the dummy proxy (Proxy_dummy) is more likely to lead to 
insignificant trade effects and less likely to have negative significant trade effects, while 
estimates obtained with the frequency proxy (Proxy_freq) are less likely to be positive and more 
likely to be insignificant. Robust regression results suggest that these three proxies have a 
significant and positive influence on the estimated trade impact of technical measures.  
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The robust regression cannot reject the null hypotheses that these three proxies are the 
same in terms of the positive and significant effect to the significance of trade effects. However, 
a similar set of tests in the MNL approach strongly rejects the null hypothesis that Proxy_dummy 
and Proxy_count have a similar impact on the probability of the technical measure estimates to 
fall in the third zone relative to the second zone (P3/P2). The null hypothesis that Proxy-dummy 
and Proxy-freq are equal in their effect on (P3/P2) cannot be rejected, nevertheless. In 
conclusion, these results are consistent with ruling out a negative influence of these proxies on 
estimated trade effects, although the two approaches disagree on their relative impacts. Finally, 
OLS and robust regression results suggest that SPS other than those proxied by MRLs (SPS_no 
_mrl) and TBT (TBT) policies lead to more negative trade coefficients. However, MNL results 
do not suggest any significant patterns. 
 
7. Robustness Checks 
We consider two major robustness checks, one associated with the existence of influential 
observations, and another one based on the cut-off values used to separate the three MNL regions 
into which technical measure estimates fall (negative significant, insignificant, positive 
significant). First, due to the cluster-structure of our sample, we undertake influential data 
diagnostics based on clusters represented by the papers included in the dataset, instead of 
individual observations. We calculate standardized DFbetas and Cook’s D statistics. The detailed 
analysis is shown in Appendix D. Following the rule of thumb on DFbetas and Cook’s D, we 
flag possible influential clusters 1, 5, 8, 21, because associated DFbetas or Cook’s Ds were 
higher than 1. To further check the influences of these papers, we drop one paper at a time and 
rerun the meta-analysis and compare regression results with those based on the full sample. 
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These are shown in Appendix F for paper 1, and Appendix G for papers 5, 8, and 21. 
Dropping observations from paper 1 causes complications with the estimates associated 
with variables Proxy_dummy, Proxy_count, and Proxy_freq, especially in the MNL model. This 
is due to a convergence problem in the MNL (the log likelihood does not converge). Variables 
Proxy_dummy, Proxy_count, and Proxy_freq are nearly co-linear once paper-1 observations are 
dropped (see Appendix E for collinearity diagnostics of the reduced sample). Results are stable 
to the deletions of observations from Papers 5, 8, or 21.   
Second, we check whether our MNL regression results are robust to different cutoff 
points of the categorical dependent variable. In the previous MNL regressions, the categorical 
dependent variable equals to -1, 0, 1 when t-values are larger than 1.96, within (-1.96, 1.96), and 
smaller than -1.96, respectively. Appendix H compares regression results for cut off points +,- 
1.96, and +,- 1.64. Changes in the regression results are small and qualitative results on 
determinants are essentially similar on signs, significance, and order of magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients. The only difference is that the intercept for the log of the probability to be 
negative relative to being insignificant (log(P1/P2) is significantly positive, suggesting that 
estimates of trade effects are more likely to be negative. So we conclude that the choice of cutoff 
values is not a cause of concern. 
 
9. Conclusions 
We conducted a meta-analysis to explain the systematic variations found in estimated trade 
effects of technical measures using both data sampling and methodology differences. Although it 
is impossible to control for all the differences among the studies, we controlled for the 
determinants that are most likely to matter, based on theoretical findings as well as important 
28 
 
conjectures found in the previous empirical literature. 
Analyses of agriculture and food industries lead to estimates of trade effects of technical 
measures, which are less likely to be positive. Trade flows in these sectors tend to be more 
impeded by technical measures than do trade flows in other sectors. Further, we find systematic 
impeding effect of SPS regulations on agricultural exports sourced from developing countries 
and going to high-income countries. Both robust regression and MNL approaches sustain this 
important finding which suggests that SPS regulations are trade barriers rather than catalysts in 
the set of studies analyzed here. We find that models that control for the “multilateral resistance” 
terms using country-pair dummies are more likely to yield positive and significant estimates of 
trade effects of technical measures than those that do not control for multilateral resistance. 
Similarly, the former studies are less likely to yield negative significant trade effects than are the 
latter. 
The evidence of the three technical measure proxies is mixed. The three proxies tend to 
have a positive effect on the estimates of trade effects of technical measures. No strong evidence 
shows that the three different forms of technical measure proxies (count, frequency, dummy) 
would lead to systematically different trade effects in the robust regression, however, the MNL 
results strongly suggest that studies based on a count proxy yield estimates that are more likely to 
be positive and much less likely to be negative. These two effects are the largest in magnitude for 
the count proxy. The results on proxies, although convoluted, are consistent with ruling out a 
negative influence of these proxies on the estimated trade effects of technical measures. The 
aggregation level of the trade data could also affect the estimated trade effects, and the more 
disaggregated data tend to provide more positive significant estimated trade effects of technical 
measures relative to the conditional sample mean of t-values. These effects were found in the 
29 
 
robust regression results but could not be confirmed with the MNL approach because of lack of 
statistical significance. 
In the future one could pool our dataset with studies analyzing multilateral, harmonized, 
and reciprocal technical measures and incorporate technical measure estimates associated with 
these standards. These standards have a different function with much potential to exhibit trade- 
expanding ability and with ambiguous effects on cost of production.
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Appendix to “A Meta-Analysis of Estimates of the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade” 
(Not intended for publication) 
Appendix A: Frequency of Zero-treatment procedures 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Collinearity diagnostic and Correction 
B.1 Before correcting for multi-collinearity 
                                         Variance 
           Variable                      Inflation 
 
           Intercept                      0 
           AG                             4.25936 
           FOOD                           3.39804 
           MANU                           4.15449 
           PROXY_DU                       8.84544 
           PROXY_CO                      14.90265 
           PROXY_FR                       8.68433 
           PROXY_MR                       4.38692 
           sample_centered              1.85510 
           SPS_no_mrl                     3.47567 
           TBT                            4.53456 
           agg_hs_centered              4.10358 
           panel_fix_time                 4.37959 
           panel_var_time                 4.13932 
           fix_pair                       5.81697 
           zero_treat                     3.20478 
           dev_SPS                        2.77476 
 
                                                       Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
                         Condition  ---------------------------------Proportion of Variation--------------------------------- 
  Number   Eigenvalue        Index    Intercept           Ag         food         manu  proxy_dummy  proxy_count   proxy_freq 
 
       1      6.60262      1.00000   0.00014148      0.00131      0.00131      0.00105   0.00072077   0.00017142   0.00062706 
       2      2.58438      1.59838   0.00000627      0.00218   0.00012860      0.00920      0.00443  1.038568E-8      0.00440 
       3      1.65042      2.00014   0.00003137      0.00192      0.02711      0.00720   0.00021007      0.00891      0.00258 
       4      1.29257      2.26011   0.00004689   0.00037427   0.00021306      0.00657   0.00065020   0.00005614   0.00002126 
       5      1.13266      2.41440   0.00001467      0.00295      0.00373      0.00125      0.00908      0.00649   0.00000357 
       6      1.08630      2.46538  6.029495E-7   0.00037023      0.00479   0.00000831      0.00243      0.00327   0.00006186 
       7      0.90035      2.70802  6.752825E-7   0.00001358      0.00305      0.00358   0.00025311      0.00450   0.00038704 
       8      0.53961      3.49800   0.00009326      0.04207      0.19364      0.00490   0.00019129      0.00272   0.00008822 
       9      0.33770      4.42172   0.00004119      0.04927      0.00104      0.19487      0.00315      0.01350      0.01553 
      10      0.28806      4.78762   0.00036348      0.00193      0.01099      0.02998      0.00647      0.00256      0.00374 
      11      0.18320      6.00332   0.00088142      0.01222   0.00007126      0.02554   0.00010143   0.00061047      0.04814 
      12      0.13099      7.09956   0.00016497      0.05553      0.00496      0.07676      0.00802      0.00134      0.07289 
      13      0.11060      7.72660   0.00019235   0.00021569      0.00348      0.00577      0.00845      0.00154      0.02128 
      14      0.08411      8.86002   0.00052414      0.00778      0.00411      0.00556      0.48008      0.00291      0.00880 
      15      0.04200     12.53772      0.00223      0.58393      0.51887      0.37453      0.05212      0.01484      0.28313 
      16      0.02954     14.95070      0.00249      0.20630      0.21712      0.24830      0.07786      0.28628      0.31143 
      17      0.00489     36.73183      0.99277      0.03163      0.00540      0.00492      0.34578      0.65029      0.22689 
Procedures Frequency 
in 
observations
Frequency 
in papers 
Negative 
significant 
estimate (%)
Insignifica
nt estimate 
(%) 
Positive 
significant 
estimate 
(%) 
Adding arbitrary 
small numbers 
4 1 100 0 0 
PPML 48 2 58 42 0 
Heckman two 
stage 
7 2 71 0 29 
Tobit 232 4 22 59 19 
Truncation 327 18 37 50 13 
Total 618 27    
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                                                   Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
          ----------------------------------------------Proportion of Variation---------------------------------------------- 
                           sample_                                agg_hs_   panel_var_   panel_fix_ 
  Number    proxy_mrl     centered   SPS_no_mrl         TBT_     centered         time         time     fix_pair   zero_treat 
 
       1   0.00007324   0.00001139   0.00076250   0.00092579   0.00003907      0.00107   0.00088252      0.00111      0.00220 
       2      0.00115      0.00557   0.00007092      0.00159   0.00066670      0.01174      0.01290   0.00002960   0.00087277 
       3   0.00001342   0.00002038  2.674196E-7   0.00021974   0.00003187      0.00985      0.01423      0.00104      0.00209 
       4      0.04172   0.00004913   0.00000828   0.00002866      0.10962      0.00285      0.00111      0.00187      0.00414 
       5      0.02495      0.11761   0.00019170   0.00030283      0.01886      0.00349      0.00741   0.00005559      0.00416 
       6      0.00770      0.21513   0.00004997   0.00060176   0.00080649      0.00404      0.00245      0.00140      0.01523 
       7      0.11800      0.08583   0.00037401  4.077222E-9      0.02056      0.02635      0.00131      0.00147      0.00449 
       8  2.519284E-7      0.06942   0.00021466      0.00182      0.00206      0.00942      0.02049      0.00101      0.00864 
       9      0.01653      0.03583   0.00097551   0.00054321      0.08413      0.00330      0.00693   7.28565E-7      0.03848 
      10   0.00061543   0.00003131   0.00007931      0.04270   0.00021456   0.00051179   0.00000372      0.01390      0.13253 
      11   0.00020803      0.00803      0.04078      0.00259      0.02024      0.11987      0.22716      0.05247      0.09642 
      12      0.04980      0.02101   0.00041923      0.00842      0.04885      0.51863      0.30485      0.04463      0.00586 
      13      0.00946   0.00034668      0.12769      0.16287      0.00187      0.02653      0.21010      0.04451      0.03374 
      14      0.03525      0.25097   0.00038779      0.01380      0.01867      0.15447      0.06208      0.05204      0.24008 
      15      0.01504      0.05652      0.08052      0.14529      0.20824      0.01009      0.02524      0.01467      0.31731 
      16   0.00056065      0.09466      0.10895      0.18816      0.27313      0.09538      0.00340      0.59749      0.09240 
      17      0.67893      0.03897      0.63854      0.43015      0.19202      0.00239      0.09947      0.17231      0.00138 
 
 
           
-Proportion of Variation- 
  Number      dev_SPS 
 
       1      0.00180 
       2      0.00557 
       3      0.01112 
       4   0.00001726 
       5      0.02457 
       6      0.05624 
       7   0.00082384 
       8   0.00092178 
       9   0.00096003 
      10      0.34274 
      11   0.00024071 
      12      0.00698 
      13      0.07420 
      14      0.37802 
      15      0.04352 
      16      0.00513 
      17      0.04716 
 
 
 
 B.2 Dropping proxy_mrl 
                             Variance 
           Variable          Inflation 
 
           Intercept         0 
           AG                4.25826 
           FOOD              3.39564 
           MANU              4.15444 
           PROXY_DU          5.85680 
           PROXY_CO          8.00077 
           PROXY_FR          7.75447 
           sample_centered     1.80913 
           SPS_no_mrl        1.63325 
           TBT               3.09905 
           agg_hs_centered 3.64273 
           panel_fix_time    4.35477 
           panel_var_time    4.13466 
           fix_pair          5.35399 
           zero_treat        3.18337 
           dev_SPS           2.55818 
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Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
                         Condition  ---------------------------------Proportion of Variation--------------------------------- 
  Number   Eigenvalue        Index    Intercept           Ag         food         manu  proxy_dummy  proxy_count   proxy_freq 
 
       1      6.59036      1.00000   0.00040301      0.00131      0.00132      0.00106      0.00109   0.00032166   0.00070962 
       2      2.56316      1.60349   0.00001958      0.00214   0.00011879      0.00942      0.00716  7.770906E-8      0.00501 
       3      1.65036      1.99832   0.00009068      0.00193      0.02712      0.00713   0.00033719      0.01661      0.00287 
       4      1.21950      2.32468   0.00006087   0.00000419      0.00162      0.00888   0.00043742   0.00018978  3.504143E-9 
       5      1.10023      2.44745   0.00005349      0.00280   0.00006299  9.724871E-7      0.01455      0.02011   0.00002354 
       6      1.04589      2.51022   0.00005487   0.00073266      0.00982   0.00082830   0.00074912      0.00345   0.00017930 
       7      0.53961      3.49475   0.00026493      0.04203      0.19380      0.00492   0.00029367      0.00508   0.00009982 
       8      0.36033      4.27668   0.00001317      0.05579   0.00041088      0.16005      0.01354      0.02979      0.01536 
       9      0.28863      4.77843   0.00088631      0.00284      0.00986      0.04236      0.01056      0.00567      0.00291 
      10      0.18366      5.99034      0.00284      0.00789   0.00004051      0.01356   0.00037474   0.00066998      0.04224 
      11      0.16585      6.30376   0.00007363      0.04068      0.01022      0.09713      0.05253      0.00423      0.05080 
      12      0.11286      7.64147   0.00004769      0.00555      0.00339      0.02136      0.00211      0.00246      0.06028 
      13      0.09143      8.49008   0.00007902   0.00087847      0.00703      0.00733      0.57762      0.00758      0.02171 
      14      0.04410     12.22499   0.00002041      0.44503      0.44698      0.32896      0.14442      0.03063      0.28628 
      15      0.02960     14.92114      0.01288      0.24324      0.24419      0.27115      0.11808      0.52017      0.31636 
      16      0.01444     21.36289      0.98221      0.14715      0.04401      0.02587      0.05615      0.35304      0.19517 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
          ----------------------------------------------Proportion of Variation---------------------------------------------- 
              sample_                                agg_hs_   panel_var_   panel_fix_ 
  Number     centered   SPS_no_mrl         TBT_     centered         time         time     fix_pair   zero_treat      dev_SPS 
 
       1   0.00001218      0.00164      0.00137   0.00004720      0.00107   0.00087290      0.00121      0.00223      0.00194 
       2      0.00620   0.00012653      0.00229      0.00101      0.01208      0.01291   0.00002560   0.00082794      0.00619 
       3   0.00002805  7.694244E-7   0.00032164   0.00005329      0.00989      0.01430      0.00114      0.00212      0.01202 
       4      0.03299   0.00007259   0.00000434      0.16385      0.00372   0.00008999      0.00233      0.00608      0.00140 
       5      0.00874   0.00029269      0.00139   0.00022983      0.01411      0.01099      0.00225      0.01272      0.08375 
       6      0.38836   0.00004803   0.00000817      0.00774      0.00832      0.00267   0.00017743      0.00852      0.00273 
       7      0.07116   0.00045958      0.00267      0.00232      0.00938      0.02062      0.00110      0.00872   0.00099493 
       8      0.02575   0.00013175      0.00179      0.07800      0.01615   0.00052455   0.00012808      0.03962   0.00062074 
       9   0.00046936   0.00001296      0.06132      0.00141      0.00107   0.00042921      0.01411      0.12152      0.37780 
      10      0.00984      0.06885      0.00337      0.02289      0.16711      0.29869      0.04550      0.10551   0.00001415 
      11   0.00006645      0.05597   0.00019573      0.00583      0.24857      0.25762      0.04548   0.00081933      0.00699 
      12      0.00791      0.25365      0.24703      0.00482      0.01369      0.07718      0.06215      0.00646      0.12947 
      13      0.25964      0.00242   0.00022227      0.07003      0.36805      0.00386      0.03795      0.29615      0.27825 
      14      0.07595      0.17747      0.26807      0.25328      0.01628      0.08982      0.02844      0.25125      0.09219 
      15      0.09668      0.22712      0.27432      0.31065      0.09189      0.00120      0.63097      0.07645      0.00461 
      16      0.01620      0.21174      0.13562      0.07784      0.01864      0.20823      0.12703      0.06100      0.00102 
 
 
B.3 Dropping the dummy for manufacturing products 
 
                             Variance 
           Variable          Inflation 
 
           Intercept         0 
           AG                2.25894 
           FOOD              1.94903 
           PROXY_DU          5.81106 
           PROXY_CO          7.16239 
           PROXY_FR          7.69855 
           sample_centered   1.66158 
           SPS_no_mrl        1.62968 
           TBT               3.09000 
           agg_hs_centered 2.58175 
           panel_fix_time    4.34327 
           panel_var_time    4.11025 
           fix_pair          4.60602 
           zero_treat        3.12483 
           dev_SPS           2.48637 
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  Collinearity Diagnostics 
                                    ---------------------------------Proportion of Variation--------------------------------- 
                         Condition                                                                                    sample_ 
  Number   Eigenvalue        Index    Intercept           Ag         food  proxy_dummy  proxy_count   proxy_freq     centered 
       1      6.35906      1.00000   0.00044806      0.00289      0.00261      0.00132   0.00041555   0.00064548   0.00002951 
       2      2.28222      1.66924   0.00008477      0.00236      0.00379      0.00832   0.00054791      0.00540      0.00927 
       3      1.53669      2.03424   0.00005645      0.00500      0.04381   0.00006771      0.01906      0.00699      0.00216 
       4      1.12113      2.38160   0.00005630      0.00148      0.00253   0.00023342      0.00743      0.00287      0.11070 
       5      1.10019      2.40416   0.00006011      0.00502   0.00017339      0.01453      0.02130   0.00005419      0.01315 
       6      1.03188      2.48245   0.00012988   0.00058806      0.01584      0.00101   0.00083534   0.00027019      0.34476 
       7      0.53366      3.45196   0.00036156      0.09170      0.34871   0.00004118      0.00272   0.00018050      0.06612 
       8      0.30354      4.57711      0.00107      0.02567      0.00406      0.02454      0.00241      0.00691      0.00924 
       9      0.21269      5.46794   0.00033850      0.26896      0.07200      0.01135      0.05148      0.03494      0.04405 
      10      0.18063      5.93339      0.00257      0.00678      0.01272      0.01229      0.00185      0.00773      0.00307 
      11      0.11869      7.31958   0.00000958      0.03304      0.03093      0.01426      0.01221      0.00813      0.04395 
      12      0.09389      8.22966   0.00051457      0.01186      0.00298      0.60578   0.00002421      0.00174      0.30382 
      13      0.07709      9.08254      0.00186      0.41587      0.44455      0.00540      0.10660      0.21495      0.00309 
      14      0.03394     13.68732      0.01500      0.00189      0.00158      0.24521      0.25833      0.48669      0.00861 
      15      0.01470     20.79751      0.97743      0.12689      0.01372      0.05565      0.51479      0.22250      0.03798 
                                                
Collinearity Diagnostics 
          -----------------------------------------------Proportion of Variation---------------------------------------------- 
                                            agg_hs_     panel_var_     panel_fix_ 
  Number   SPS_no_mrl           TBT_       centered           time           time       fix_pair     zero_treat        dev_SPS 
       1      0.00172        0.00137     0.00012594        0.00128        0.00107        0.00149        0.00236        0.00239 
       2   0.00033167        0.00371     0.00019566        0.01846        0.01947     0.00008374        0.00145        0.00419 
       3   0.00007759     0.00000825        0.00984        0.00289        0.00734        0.00314        0.00722        0.02058 
       4   0.00038759     0.00023438        0.21639     0.00090300     0.00000472     0.00059470     0.00030527     0.00057740 
       5   0.00026725        0.00134        0.00123        0.01432        0.01094        0.00269        0.01304        0.08729 
       6   0.00028875     0.00014550        0.07318        0.01155        0.00318     0.00036120        0.00841     0.00079697 
       7   0.00083327        0.00353     0.00002164        0.01038        0.02165        0.00105        0.00677     0.00019472 
       8   0.00020774        0.05903        0.01584        0.01429     0.00033570        0.00681        0.16946        0.27747 
       9      0.04434        0.00225        0.05349        0.03821     0.00065966        0.06607        0.00360        0.07422 
      10      0.01998        0.00291        0.01119        0.35789        0.48014        0.01023        0.09702     0.00094268 
      11      0.29006        0.21523     0.00003049     0.00041904        0.15650        0.00514        0.00721        0.25141 
      12      0.01657        0.00638        0.02131        0.18367     0.00018911        0.15158        0.20332        0.26181 
      13      0.01421     0.00097841        0.34976        0.27283        0.05388        0.15258        0.18657    4.114748E-7 
      14      0.41404        0.57021        0.03596        0.04568        0.01864        0.36401        0.23757        0.01378 
      15      0.19670        0.13266        0.21145        0.02722        0.22601        0.23417        0.05570        0.00435 
 
Appendix C.  Sensitivity of results to variable deletion (one by one) 
Explanatory Var. Multinomial Logit (all variables) 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Intercept 1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
2.15** 
(1.11) 
-0.36 
(0.99) 
2.14** 
(1.10) 
0.37 
(0.90) 
Ag 0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
  -0.05 
(0.34) 
-0.60** 
(0.25) 
Food 0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
0.55 
(0.40) 
-0.36 
(0.59) 
  
Proxy_dummy -2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
-2.29*** 
(0.78) 
-2.25** 
(0.96) 
-2.22*** 
(0.76) 
-2.37*** 
(0.90) 
Proxy_count -2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
-2.24** 
(0.98) 
0.54 
(0.97) 
-1.89** 
(0.94) 
0.27 
(0.75) 
Proxy_freq -1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
-1.68*** 
(0.66) 
-1.16* 
(0.64) 
-1.79*** 
(0.73) 
-1.39*** 
(0.56) 
Sample_centered 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-0.53 
(0.50) 
-0.29 
(0.39) 
-0.51 
(0.47) 
-0.45 
(0.38) 
TBT -0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.65) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.62) 
-0.11 
(0.22) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
Panel_var_time 
 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
1.70** 
(0.74) 
-0.80 
(0.83) 
1.39** 
(0.69) 
-0.60 
(0.68) 
Fix_country_pair -1.81** 
(0.83) 
-1.81** 
(0.83) 
-1.78** 
(0.81) 
0.19 
(0.76) 
-1.61** 
(0.77) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
Zero_treated 0.42 
(0.43) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.51 
(0.39) 
0.41 
(0.44) 
0.62 
(0.38) 
0.43 
(0.34) 
dev_SPS 1.03** 
(0.44) 
1.03** 
(0.44) 
1.10*** 
(0.40) 
0.11 
(0.66) 
1.19*** 
(0.39) 
0.13 
(0.65) 
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Appendix C.  Sensitivity of results to variable deletion (one by one) (cont.) 
Explanatory 
Var. 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Intercept 0.75 
(1.02) 
-0.44 
(1.02) 
0.4 
(0.91) 
1.18*** 
(0.42) 
1.09 
(1.04) 
-0.64 
(0.99) 
1.68 
(1.26) 
0.87 
(1.02) 
Ag 0.43 
(0.44) 
-1.03*** 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.47) 
-1.05*** 
(0.26) 
0.54* 
(0.33) 
-0.72** 
(0.35) 
0.44 
(0.44) 
-0.92*** 
(0.34) 
Food 0.72 
(0.48) 
-0.94*** 
(0.48) 
0.36 
(0.59) 
-0.83** 
(0.39) 
0.84** 
(0.40) 
-0.66 
(0.43) 
0.83* 
(0.45) 
-0.71 
(0.48) 
Proxy_dummy   -1.04* 
(0.55) 
-2.44** 
(1.01) 
-1.51** 
(0.72) 
-1.16 
(0.84) 
-1.95*** 
(0.72) 
-1.27 
(0.80) 
Proxy_count -0.96 
(0.84) 
1.86** 
(0.93) 
  -1.23* 
(0.69) 
2.14*** 
(0.83) 
-2.50*** 
(0.99) 
-0.03 
(1.04) 
Proxy_freq -0.58 
(0.70) 
-1.33* 
(0.70) 
-0.39 
(0.47) 
-2.45*** 
(0.63) 
  -1.65** 
(0.83) 
-2.50*** 
(0.85) 
Sample_centered 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 
 
SPS_no_mrl -0.57 
(0.50) 
-0.37
(0.52) 
-0.41 
(0.49) 
-0.35 
(0.40) 
-0.71 
(0.46) 
-0.61 
(0.41) 
-0.43 
(0.50) 
-0.35 
(0.44) 
TBT -0.30 
(0.74) 
-0.19 
(0.27) 
-0.35
(0.70) 
-0.04 
(0.22) 
-0.37 
(0.63) 
-0.41* 
(0.22) 
-0.11 
(0.64) 
-0.15 
(0.22) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.28** 
(0.12) 
-0.16 
(0.17) 
-0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
Panel_var_time 
 
0.72 
(0.81) 
-2.15** 
(0.95) 
1.13 
(0.99) 
-1.19 
(1.07) 
1.62* 
(0.91) 
-1.35 
(0.89) 
1.80*** 
(0.68) 
-1.41 
(1.11) 
Fix_country_pair -1.36* 
(0.84) 
0.51 
(0.76) 
-0.62 
(0.53) 
-0.36 
(0.38) 
-1.29 
(0.80) 
0.93 
(0.85) 
-1.91** 
(0.82) 
-0.52 
(0.81) 
Zero_treated 0.45 
(0.48) 
1.01** 
(0.42) 
0.16 
(0.48) 
1.12*** 
(0.43) 
-0.18 
(0.35) 
-0.01 
(0.41) 
0.64 
(0.45) 
1.50*** 
(0.59) 
dev_SPS 0.10 
(0.41) 
-0.80 
(0.49) 
0.83*** 
(0.34) 
0.21 
(0.62) 
0.93** 
(0.46) 
0.14 
(0.65) 
0.81** 
(0.39) 
-0.42 
(0.66) 
 
Explanatory 
Var. 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
 
Intercept 1.33 
(0.99) 
-0.04 
(0.69) 
1.84 
(1.14) 
0.48 
(0.77) 
2.20** 
(1.12) 
0.52 
(0.83) 
2.07** 
(0.88) 
0.75 
(0.80) 
0.62 
(1.03) 
0.74 
(0.55) 
Ag 0.34 
(0.41) 
-0.99*** 
(0.24) 
0.30 
(0.42) 
-1.02*** 
(0.24) 
0.31 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.26) 
0.25 
(0.39) 
-0.88*** 
(0.23) 
0.25 
(0.45) 
-1.09*** 
(0.28) 
Food 0.69 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.43) 
0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.43) 
0.75* 
(0.44) 
-0.90** 
(0.43) 
0.38 
(0.53) 
-0.63** 
(0.31) 
0.46 
(0.59) 
-0.92** 
(0.42) 
Proxy_dummy -2.23*** 
(0.84) 
-2.08*** 
(0.84) 
-2.23*** 
(0.80) 
-2.11*** 
(0.85) 
-2.48*** 
(0.64) 
-1.98*** 
(0.55) 
-1.25** 
(0.53) 
-3.00*** 
(1.03) 
-1.58** 
(0.66) 
-2.03** 
(0.91) 
Proxy_count -2.16** 
(0.92) 
0.87 
(0.68) 
-2.28** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.75) 
-2.64*** 
(0.69) 
0.82 
(0.74) 
-1.72* 
(0.91) 
0.38 
(0.56) 
-0.40 
(0.43) 
0.58 
(0.36) 
Proxy_freq -1.63** 
(0.78) 
-2.08*** 
(0.57) 
-1.51** 
(0.68) 
-2.01*** 
(0.58) 
-1.51** 
(0.70) 
-1.90*** 
(0.49) 
-1.47 
(0.91) 
-1.63*** 
(0.56) 
-0.63 
(0.66) 
-2.08*** 
(0.70) 
Sample_centered 0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl   -0.47 
(0.40) 
-0.3 
(0.32) 
-0.54 
(0.55) 
-0.40 
(0.37) 
-0.53 
(0.54) 
-0.42 
(0.37) 
-0.53 
(0.46) 
-0.35 
(0.42) 
TBT 0.07 
(0.63) 
0.06 
(0.22) 
  -0.01 
(0.63) 
-0.08 
(0.24) 
-0.59 
(0.77) 
-0.15 
(0.27) 
-0.59 
(0.72) 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.13 
(0.16) 
0.00 
(0.18) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
  -0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.37*** 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
Panel_var_time 
 
1.72** 
(0.78) 
-1.19* 
(0.73) 
1.71*** 
(0.63) 
-1.22* 
(0.74) 
1.90*** 
(0.71) 
-1.31 
(0.82) 
  1.16 
(1.16) 
-1.22 
(0.96) 
Fix_country_pair -1.80** 
(0.80) 
0.19 
(0.61) 
-1.83*** 
(0.73) 
0.14 
(0.65) 
-2.08*** 
(0.61) 
0.21 
(0.70) 
-1.41* 
(0.86) 
-0.02 
(0.53) 
  
Zero_treated 0.47 
(0.44) 
0.94*** 
(0.34) 
0.44 
(0.39) 
0.90 
(0.36) 
0.34 
(0.46) 
0.84** 
(0.37) 
0.64 
(0.58) 
0.53 
(0.34) 
-0.02 
(0.37) 
0.97** 
(0.40) 
dev_SPS 0.94** 
(0.46) 
0.14 
(0.55) 
1.03** 
(0.43) 
0.20 
(0.59) 
1.12*** 
(0.42) 
0.12 
(0.49) 
0.56 
(0.36) 
0.69 
(0.68) 
0.81** 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.59) 
39 
 
Appendix C.  Sensitivity of results to variable deletion (one by one) (cont.) 
Explanatory 
Var. 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=   
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  
Intercept 1.88 
(1.23) 
0.29 
(0.93) 
1.42 
(1.06) 
0.4 
(0.89) 
Ag 0.34 
(0.36) 
-0.84*** 
(0.28) 
0.50
(0.39) 
-0.98***
(0.25) 
Food 0.73* 
(0.40) 
-0.68** 
(0.38) 
0.86**
(0.42) 
-0.83*
(0.45) 
Proxy_dummy -2.27*** 
(0.92) 
-2.22** 
(0.95) 
-1.31***
(0.47) 
-1.86***
(0.42) 
Proxy_count -2.12** 
(1.01) 
1.11 
(0.75) 
-1.98**
(0.91) 
0.79
(0.72) 
Proxy_freq -1.13** 
(0.52) 
-1.07*** 
(0.41) 
-1.38*
(0.83) 
-1.89***
(0.62) 
Sample_centered 0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.01
(0.01) 
0.02**
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.53 
(0.47) 
-0.50 
(0.37) 
-0.27
(0.52) 
-0.38
(0.38) 
TBT -0.14 
(0.62) 
-0.24 
(0.22) 
-0.18
(0.70) 
-0.10 
(0.23) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.07 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
Panel_var_time 
 
1.75** 
(0.81) 
-1.04 
(0.73) 
1.19 
(0.77) 
-1.28 
(0.82) 
Fix_country pair -1.63** 
(0.82) 
0.63
(0.61) 
-1.63** 
(0.82) 
0.25 
(0.59) 
Zero_treated   0.35 
(0.50) 
0.79** 
(0.41) 
dev_SPS 0.99** 
(0.50) 
0.31 
(0.69) 
  
 
Appendix D: Influential cluster diagnostics 
 
                                                                                DFBETA_    DFBETA_    DFBETA_    DFBETA_ 
                                                          DFBETA_    DFBETA_    PROXY_     PROXY_     PROXY_     SAMPLE_ 
Obs   _INDEX    I    NI   TRQWCLS   COOKDCLS     GCLS       AG        FOOD       DUMMY      COUNT      FREQ     CENTERED 
 
  1      1      1    38   1.26513    1.56602   2.72887    0.06238    0.16764    2.37680    1.82707    3.25563   -0.00641 
  2      2      2     2   0.04264    0.00014   0.00002    0.00204    0.00237   -0.01965   -0.01823   -0.00094    0.00021 
  3      3      3     2   0.16541    0.00378   0.00244    0.00266    0.00426   -0.11925   -0.10823   -0.05178    0.00062 
  4      4      4     1   0.10237    0.00405   0.01983    0.00324   -0.00309   -0.00412   -0.02882   -0.12583   -0.00096 
  5      5      5     6   1.02539    1.72846   0.41135    0.02714    0.04644    0.05079   -0.13622    0.12322   -0.10410 
  6      6      6    40   1.16089    0.29400   2.27192   -0.03127   -0.02234   -0.38084    0.02675    0.01298    0.00339 
  7      7      7     2   0.03037    0.00219   0.04693    0.03456    0.02051   -0.00011   -0.02445    0.00617   -0.00090 
  8      8      8    84   1.01664    0.93164   4.01728    0.22252   -0.09988   -1.21095   -0.17492    0.22811    0.01540 
  9      9      9     2   0.05568    0.00042   0.00021    0.00556    0.00615   -0.01980   -0.02246   -0.01315   -0.00021 
 10     10     10     3   0.08221    0.00816   0.09360   -0.02151   -0.01076    0.09461    0.09196    0.03464    0.00025 
 11     11     11     3   0.03994    0.00002   0.19587    0.00302    0.00146   -0.00116   -0.00327   -0.00298   -0.00013 
 12     12     12    46   0.51806    0.00229   3.47340    0.00043   -0.00011   -0.02843    0.02903    0.00490    0.00081 
 13     13     13     5   0.33451    0.09006   0.27954    0.06097    0.00937   -0.13463    0.04604   -0.09147    0.00293 
 14     14     14     1   0.08486    0.00194   0.00696    0.01502    0.01506   -0.01510   -0.03046   -0.03566   -0.00103 
 15     16     15     9   0.56677    0.08953   0.59380   -0.03299   -0.02145   -0.36683    0.03280   -0.02889    0.00951 
 
                   DFBETA_     DFBETA_      DFBETA_                  DFBETA_                                        DFBETAS_ 
       DFBETA_     SPS_NO_     AGG_HS_    PANEL_VAR_     DFBETA_      ZERO_      DFBETA_    DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_     PROXY_ 
Obs     TBT_         MRL      CENTERED       TIME       FIX_PAIR      TREAT      DEV_SPS       AG         FOOD        DUMMY 
 
  1   -1.08035    -1.13127     0.18768     -0.13943     -0.60612    -0.53881     0.06980     0.26849     0.68865     2.75791 
  2    0.00595    -0.00336     0.00153      0.02627     -0.00551     0.00308     0.01627     0.00878     0.00974    -0.02280 
  3    0.00922    -0.01731    -0.00763      0.10384      0.02560     0.08196     0.03376     0.01146     0.01749    -0.13837 
  4    0.00854    -0.00212    -0.00199      0.00878     -0.04224     0.06110     0.01661     0.01395    -0.01268    -0.00478 
  5   -0.00904    -0.14407     0.02916      0.14806     -0.07241     0.01542     0.10751     0.11682     0.19078     0.05893 
  6   -0.18788     0.13131    -0.02339      0.02308      0.00559     0.09450     0.70854    -0.13458    -0.09176    -0.44191 
  7    0.00043     0.00139     0.01429      0.00765     -0.01846    -0.01983    -0.01051     0.14872     0.08424    -0.00012 
  8   -0.36276    -0.12769    -0.10943      0.75690     -0.15817     0.40439    -0.50404     0.95770    -0.41030    -1.40511 
  9    0.00462    -0.00656    -0.00665      0.00456     -0.00540     0.01314     0.02922     0.02391     0.02527    -0.02297 
 10   -0.03076     0.03536     0.01637     -0.03388      0.02733    -0.05654    -0.16616    -0.09258    -0.04420     0.10978 
 11   -0.00036    -0.00010    -0.00148     -0.00167     -0.00108     0.00098    -0.00020     0.01300     0.00598    -0.00135 
 12    0.00914    -0.00121    -0.00642     -0.04485     -0.00382    -0.04028     0.02208     0.00184    -0.00045    -0.03299 
 13   -0.15806    -0.09009    -0.05331     -0.19112      0.48746    -0.10895    -0.07715     0.26240     0.03850    -0.15622 
40 
 
 14   -0.00363    -0.00211    -0.02039     -0.01391     -0.00457     0.01805     0.00297     0.06465     0.06185    -0.01752 
 15    0.00934    -0.05911     0.05961     -0.20778      0.24915     0.05698     0.08787    -0.14198    -0.08810    -0.42565 
 
DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_                DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_     DFBETAS_                 DFBETAS_ 
       PROXY_      PROXY_      SAMPLE_    DFBETAS_     SPS_NO_     AGG_HS_    PANEL_VAR_    DFBETAS_      ZERO_     DFBETAS_ 
Obs     COUNT       FREQ      CENTERED      TBT_         MRL      CENTERED       TIME       FIX_PAIR      TREAT      DEV_SPS 
 
  1    2.07424     3.62130    -0.23230    -2.54296    -2.78564     1.19871     -0.18881     -1.17014    -0.83629     0.12200 
  2   -0.02070    -0.00104     0.00751     0.01401    -0.00827     0.00980      0.03557     -0.01064     0.00479     0.02843 
  3   -0.12287    -0.05760     0.02252     0.02170    -0.04263    -0.04874      0.14061      0.04942     0.12721     0.05900 
  4   -0.03272    -0.13997    -0.03468     0.02011    -0.00522    -0.01272      0.01189     -0.08154     0.09483     0.02902 
  5   -0.15464     0.13706    -3.77411    -0.02127    -0.35476     0.18626      0.20049     -0.13978     0.02393     0.18790 
  6    0.03036     0.01444     0.12301    -0.44223     0.32334    -0.14940      0.03126      0.01079     0.14668     1.23837 
  7   -0.02775     0.00686    -0.03252     0.00100     0.00342     0.09124      0.01036     -0.03564    -0.03078    -0.01838 
  8   -0.19859     0.25373     0.55825    -0.85387    -0.31441    -0.69889      1.02496     -0.30535     0.62766    -0.88095 
  9   -0.02550    -0.01463    -0.00762     0.01088    -0.01616    -0.04245      0.00617     -0.01042     0.02040     0.05106 
 10    0.10440     0.03853     0.00922    -0.07241     0.08706     0.10458     -0.04588      0.05276    -0.08775    -0.29041 
 11   -0.00371    -0.00331    -0.00489    -0.00084    -0.00024    -0.00942     -0.00227     -0.00208     0.00152    -0.00035 
 12    0.03296     0.00546     0.02929     0.02150    -0.00299    -0.04100     -0.06074     -0.00738    -0.06252     0.03860 
 13    0.05227    -0.10174     0.10636    -0.37205    -0.22183    -0.34045     -0.25880      0.94105    -0.16911    -0.13484 
 14   -0.03458    -0.03966    -0.03748    -0.00855    -0.00520    -0.13023     -0.01883     -0.00883     0.02801     0.00519 
 15    0.03724    -0.03214     0.34495     0.02199    -0.14555     0.38069     -0.28137      0.48098     0.08844     0.15357 
 
 
                                                                                DFBETA_    DFBETA_    DFBETA_    DFBETA_ 
                                                          DFBETA_    DFBETA_    PROXY_     PROXY_     PROXY_     SAMPLE_ 
Obs   _INDEX    I    NI   TRQWCLS   COOKDCLS     GCLS       AG        FOOD       DUMMY      COUNT      FREQ     CENTERED 
 
 16     17     16    21   0.60194    0.14801   0.73942   -0.03061   -0.03032    0.02439    0.13849    0.13159    0.00771 
 17     18     17     6   0.57660    0.20906   0.17089   -0.00201   -0.02267   -0.44844   -0.01387   -0.24454    0.00155 
 18     20     18     8   0.45321    0.00175   0.38437    0.00016   -0.00025    0.00616   -0.01002    0.00437    0.00002 
 19     21     19    90   1.57049    0.49289   3.09908   -0.09095   -0.03326   -0.60523   -0.64504   -1.08274    0.00306 
 20     22     20   182   1.46673    0.51056   5.46388   -0.13596    0.20653    0.25801    0.22899   -0.86096    0.00187 
 21     23     21     2   0.40148    0.22611   0.24607   -0.06932   -0.01907    0.61339   -0.03863   -0.25924   -0.01982 
 22     24     22     1   0.11563    0.00448   0.01834    0.00566    0.00031    0.00304   -0.02388   -0.10397   -0.00077 
 23     25     23     4   0.43959    0.24532   0.25354   -0.01269   -0.03666    0.33225   -0.45443   -0.05981   -0.01193 
 24     26     24     4   0.26463    0.00301   0.14339   -0.01605   -0.01404   -0.02226    0.07856    0.02900    0.00194 
 25     27     25    56   0.61883    0.20499   3.92662   -0.10480   -0.18842    0.18888    0.23937    0.71814   -0.00003 
 
                   DFBETA_     DFBETA_      DFBETA_                  DFBETA_                                        DFBETAS_ 
       DFBETA_     SPS_NO_     AGG_HS_    PANEL_VAR_     DFBETA_      ZERO_      DFBETA_    DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_     PROXY_ 
Obs     TBT_         MRL      CENTERED       TIME       FIX_PAIR      TREAT      DEV_SPS       AG         FOOD        DUMMY 
 
 16   -0.17268    -0.14531     0.02930      0.10959      0.59215    -0.28690     0.07921    -0.13172    -0.12455     0.02830 
 17    0.27359     0.25912     0.07574      0.67705     -0.38290     0.17764     0.04018    -0.00867    -0.09311    -0.52034 
 18   -0.01749     0.03336    -0.00150      0.00840     -0.01466    -0.02947    -0.02856     0.00067    -0.00101     0.00714 
 19    0.96636     0.64087     0.05015      0.18667     -0.45991    -0.00801     0.11992    -0.39145    -0.13664    -0.70228 
 20   -0.05335    -0.01106    -0.07592      0.11198     -0.13811    -0.45561    -0.03838    -0.58515     0.84841     0.29937 
 21   -0.03035    -0.14651    -0.15527     -0.57159      0.11263     0.55389    -0.04331    -0.29835    -0.07833     0.71174 
 22    0.01042    -0.00077     0.01365      0.02124     -0.04593     0.04435     0.01147     0.02436     0.00129     0.00353 
 23    0.08945     0.16300     0.09182     -0.47012     -0.36150     0.37859    -0.01926    -0.05461    -0.15058     0.38553 
 24   -0.00795    -0.01653    -0.00076      0.05449      0.04637    -0.04660     0.00183    -0.06908    -0.05767    -0.02583 
 25    0.08178     0.10075    -0.09083     -0.10525     -0.16823    -0.08655     0.00871    -0.45105    -0.77403     0.21916 
 
      DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_                DFBETAS_    DFBETAS_     DFBETAS_                 DFBETAS_ 
       PROXY_      PROXY_      SAMPLE_    DFBETAS_     SPS_NO_     AGG_HS_    PANEL_VAR_    DFBETAS_      ZERO_     DFBETAS_ 
Obs     COUNT       FREQ      CENTERED      TBT_         MRL      CENTERED       TIME       FIX_PAIR      TREAT      DEV_SPS 
 
 16    0.15723     0.14637     0.27966    -0.40645    -0.35781     0.18716      0.14841      1.14316    -0.44529     0.13843 
 17   -0.01575    -0.27201     0.05619     0.64400     0.63806     0.48372      0.91684     -0.73921     0.27571     0.07022 
 18   -0.01138     0.00486     0.00083    -0.04116     0.08215    -0.00956      0.01138     -0.02831    -0.04574    -0.04991 
 19   -0.73230    -1.20435     0.11094     2.27465     1.57807     0.32027      0.25278     -0.88786    -0.01242     0.20959 
 20    0.25997    -0.95766     0.06797    -0.12558    -0.02724    -0.48487      0.15164     -0.26662    -0.70716    -0.06708 
 21   -0.04386    -0.28836    -0.71854    -0.07144    -0.36076    -0.99171     -0.77402      0.21744     0.85970    -0.07569 
 22   -0.02711    -0.11565    -0.02810     0.02453    -0.00191     0.08718      0.02876     -0.08867     0.06884     0.02004 
 23   -0.51591    -0.06653    -0.43266     0.21056     0.40138     0.58644     -0.63662     -0.69788     0.58762    -0.03367 
 24    0.08919     0.03226     0.07040    -0.01872    -0.04071    -0.00487      0.07379      0.08952    -0.07233     0.00319 
 25    0.27176     0.79880    -0.00101     0.19250     0.24808    -0.58013     -0.14252     -0.32477    -0.13433     0.01523 
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Appendix E. Robustness checks. Influential cluster check 
 Full data set Paper 1 observations dropped 
Explanatory Var. Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit  
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit      
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  
Intercept -0.11 
(0.73) 
1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
-1.64** 
(0.75) 
2.63* 
(1.62) 
-18.45*** 
(1.21) 
Ag -0.93*** 
(0.31) 
0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
-0.72** 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.50) 
-1.16*** 
(0.19) 
Food -1.18*** 
(0.31) 
0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
-0.82*** 
(0.32) 
0.48 
(0.56) 
-0.80* 
(0.45) 
Proxy_dummy 1.74*** 
(0.55) 
-2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
4.61*** 
(0.96) 
-3.98** 
(1.71) 
17.72# 
(.) 
Proxy_count 2.12*** 
(0.63) 
-2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
4.42*** 
(0.84) 
-3.59** 
(1.66) 
20.35 
(1.11) 
Proxy_freq 2.17*** 
(0.58) 
-1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
5.88*** 
(1.14) 
-3.71** 
(1.62) 
18.37*** 
(0.76) 
Sample_centered -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.81** 
(0.39) 
-0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-1.93*** 
(0.55) 
0.25 
(0.38) 
-0.96*** 
(0.17) 
TBT -1.18*** 
(0.40) 
-0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-1.80*** 
(0.48) 
0.45 
(0.60) 
-0.58*** 
(0.22) 
Agg_hs_centered 0.56*** 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.71*** 
(0.12) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.20) 
Panel_fix_time -1.79*** 
(0.66) 
         n/a 
 
     n/a 
 
-1.72*** 
(0.64) 
n/a n/a 
Panel_var_time 
 
-1.07* 
(0.57) 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
-1.25* 
(0.70) 
-1.00* 
(0.57) 
1.80** 
(0.77) 
-0.92 
(0.75) 
Fix_country_pair 2.89*** 
(0.45) 
-1.81** 
(0.83) 
0.17 
(0.62) 
2.07*** 
(0.47) 
-1.65* 
(0.86) 
-0.10 
(0.63) 
Zero_treated -2.93*** 
(0.36) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.88** 
(0.37) 
-2.80*** 
(0.36) 
0.67 
(0.51) 
0.81** 
(0.41) 
dev_SPS -2.53*** 
(0.38) 
1.03** 
(0.44) 
0.20 
(0.58) 
-1.77*** 
(0.40) 
0.97** 
(0.50) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
 
Appendix F: Collinearity diagnostics after dropping paper-1 observations 
 
                             Variance 
           Variable          Inflation 
 
           Intercept         0 
           AG                2.50509 
           FOOD              2.09474 
           PROXY_DU          17.90650 
           PROXY_CO          13.08322 
           PROXY_FR          30.19550 
           sample_centered   1.72507 
           SPS_no_mrl        3.48151 
           TBT               4.43546 
           Agg_hs_centered   2.98314 
           panel_fix_time    4.34459 
           panel_var_time    4.14421 
           fix_pair          4.98734 
           zero_treat        3.16858 
           dev_SPS           2.82814 
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 Collinearity Diagnostics 
                                    ---------------------------------Proportion of Variation--------------------------------- 
                         Condition                                                                                    sample_ 
  Number   Eigenvalue        Index    Intercept           Ag         food  proxy_dummy  proxy_count   proxy_freq     centered 
 
       1      6.43003      1.00000   0.00041801      0.00254      0.00231   0.00042497   0.00022618   0.00016038   0.00002384 
       2      2.29148      1.67513   0.00007444      0.00241      0.00335      0.00256   0.00030161      0.00138      0.00899 
       3      1.56268      2.02849   0.00006195      0.00464      0.04258   0.00000718      0.01095      0.00152      0.00164 
       4      1.13164      2.38370   0.00013333   0.00001387      0.00139   0.00082509   0.00005505   0.00081172      0.08873 
       5      1.09480      2.42348   0.00000674      0.00651   0.00088571      0.00420      0.01350   0.00016685      0.01370 
       6      1.03325      2.49462   0.00010973   0.00031699      0.01520   0.00013782   0.00026428   0.00010800      0.34938 
       7      0.53374      3.47091   0.00038311      0.07872      0.32651   0.00002054      0.00172   0.00005819      0.06563 
       8      0.29079      4.70235      0.00105      0.06438   0.00063492      0.01217      0.00515   0.00016256      0.01540 
       9      0.18918      5.83004      0.00201      0.05527      0.00603      0.00224      0.00354      0.00506      0.02500 
      10      0.16866      6.17442   0.00070310      0.14638      0.07042   0.00000574      0.01340   0.00002502      0.01558 
      11      0.11347      7.52782   0.00004936      0.14660      0.10635      0.04444      0.01708   0.00064534      0.17042 
      12      0.07611      9.19119   0.00008664      0.22377      0.26178      0.11086      0.03591      0.02159      0.10303 
      13      0.05886     10.45235      0.00592      0.10705      0.13203      0.00728      0.07967      0.00577      0.08467 
      14      0.01664     19.65733      0.68624      0.12347      0.01633      0.05480      0.02793      0.02006      0.05429 
      15      0.00869     27.20310      0.30276      0.03793      0.01419      0.76004      0.79031      0.94248      0.00351 
 
                                                   Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
          -----------------------------------------------Proportion of Variation---------------------------------------------- 
                                            agg_hs_     panel_var_     panel_fix_ 
  Number   SPS_no_mrl           TBT_       centered           time           time       fix_pair     zero_treat        dev_SPS 
 
       1   0.00083842     0.00098072     0.00023248        0.00126        0.00107        0.00144        0.00224        0.00207 
       2   0.00015071        0.00282     0.00001106        0.01764        0.01872     0.00006463        0.00161        0.00359 
       3   0.00004398     0.00001173        0.00716        0.00256        0.00676        0.00362        0.00521        0.01579 
       4   0.00004923     0.00003089        0.15047        0.00873        0.00315        0.00286        0.00255        0.02469 
       5   0.00027011        0.00108        0.04063        0.00812        0.00952     0.00051777        0.00849        0.05430 
       6   0.00015785     0.00014323        0.05638        0.00904        0.00209     0.00036917        0.00820        0.00310 
       7   0.00046510        0.00299    8.326171E-7        0.00997        0.02195        0.00149        0.00704     0.00025722 
       8   0.00020810        0.04732        0.01959        0.03187     0.00053344     0.00008345        0.15499        0.17123 
       9      0.05676        0.01979        0.04746        0.10372        0.21396        0.04419        0.05033        0.02607 
      10      0.03064        0.02085        0.01131        0.30420        0.29891        0.00259        0.03243        0.06142 
      11      0.06188        0.09443        0.00494        0.03617        0.12637     0.00002564        0.00323        0.55245 
      12   0.00000929        0.01835        0.14883        0.32239        0.04187        0.02462        0.53506        0.02747 
      13   0.00004975        0.12451        0.28033        0.12157        0.00501        0.76144        0.07461        0.00619 
      14      0.40015        0.36573        0.20801        0.00561        0.24553        0.15524        0.01016     0.00000654 
      15      0.44832        0.30095        0.02465        0.01715        0.00456        0.00146        0.10387        0.05135 
 
Appendix G: Robustness check. Influential cluster checks for papers 5, 8, and 21 
 
 Full data set Paper 5 observations dropped Paper 8 observations dropped Paper 21 observations dropped 
Explanatory 
 Var. 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  
 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
   Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
Robust 
Regression 
Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
 Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
Intercept -0.11 
(0.73) 
1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
-0.54 
(0.80) 
1.90 
(1.20) 
0.52 
(0.92) 
-0.59 
(0.82) 
1.85 
(1.17) 
0.51 
(0.82) 
-0.98 
(0.86) 
2.04 
(1.43) 
-1.62 
(1.37) 
Ag -0.93*** 
(0.31) 
0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
-0.88*** 
(0.32) 
0.27 
(0.41) 
-0.97*** 
(0.34) 
-0.72** 
(0.37) 
-0.07 
(0.37) 
-1.17*** 
(0.24) 
-1.06*** 
(0.31) 
0.39 
(0.44) 
-0.84*** 
(0.26) 
Food -1.18*** 
(0.31) 
0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
-1.13*** 
(0.32) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
-0.82* 
(0.47) 
-1.28*** 
(0.37) 
0.76 
(0.49) 
-0.77** 
(0.41) 
-1.37*** 
(0.32) 
0.69 
(0.57) 
-1.71 
(0.25) 
Proxy_dummy 1.74*** 
(0.55) 
-2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
1.84*** 
(0.55) 
-2.23*** 
(0.84) 
-2.09** 
(1.02) 
2.45*** 
(0.87) 
-1.24 
(1.12) 
-1.68 
(1.27) 
1.43*** 
(0.55) 
-1.79***
(0.66) 
-1.46 
(0.99) 
Proxy_count 2.12*** 
(0.63) 
-2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
2.11*** 
(0.63) 
-2.24*** 
(0.98) 
0.53 
(0.85) 
2.30*** 
(0.71) 
-2.22*** 
(0.91) 
0.75 
(0.66) 
1.43* 
(0.75) 
-1.43 
(0.95) 
1.93* 
(1.02) 
Proxy_freq 2.17*** 
(0.58) 
-1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
1.98*** 
(0.58) 
-1.47** 
(0.75) 
-2.07*** 
(0.59) 
2.30*** 
(0.65) 
-1.71** 
(0.77) 
-2.01*** 
(0.57) 
1.54*** 
(0.60) 
-0.93 
(0.71) 
-2.15*** 
(0.73) 
Sample_centered -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.20 
(0.13) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.18* 
(0.10) 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.81** 
(0.39) 
-0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-0.69* 
(0.40) 
-0.45 
(0.50) 
-0.43 
(0.36) 
-0.71* 
(0.43) 
-0.49 
(0.50) 
-0.41 
(0.39) 
-0.97** 
(0.45) 
-0.29 
(0.68) 
0.65 
(0.54) 
TBT -1.18*** 
(0.40) 
-0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-1.04*** 
(0.41) 
-0.08 
(0.66) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.92** 
(0.48) 
0.27 
(0.66) 
0.02 
(0.23) 
-0.26 
(0.55) 
-0.86 
(0.69) 
0.22 
(0.62) 
Agg_hs_centered 0.56*** 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.57*** 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.17) 
0.33** 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.32) 
-0.29** 
(0.13) 
Panel_fix_time -1.79*** 
(0.66) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
-1.31* 
(0.72) 
n/a n/a -1.95*** 
(0.75) 
n/a n/a -0.96* 
(0.58) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
Panel_var_time -1.07* 
(0.57) 
1.68** 
(0.76) 
-1.25* 
(0.70) 
-1.15** 
(0.57) 
1.65** 
(0.78) 
-1.04 
(0.87) 
-1.44** 
(0.73) 
1.17 
(0.93) 
-1.42** 
(0.58) 
-1.18* 
(0.66) 
1.10 
(0.77) 
-1.90*** 
(0.69) 
Fix_country_ pair 2.89*** 
(0.45) 
-1.81** 
(0.83) 
0.17 
(0.62) 
2.90*** 
(0.45) 
-1.80** 
(0.82) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
2.81*** 
(0.51) 
-1.78** 
(0.76) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
2.95*** 
(0.47) 
-1.52* 
(0.88) 
0.86 
(0.76) 
Zero_treated -2.93*** 
(0.36) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.88** 
(0.37) 
-2.74*** 
(0.37) 
0.40 
(0.44) 
0.99** 
(0.43) 
-2.90*** 
(0.41) 
0.36 
(0.37) 
0.81*** 
(0.32) 
-1.98*** 
(0.55) 
-0.10 
(0.90) 
1.48** 
(0.63) 
dev_SPS -2.53*** 
(0.38) 
1.03** 
(0.44) 
0.20 
(0.58) 
-2.58*** 
(0.38) 
1.02** 
(0.43) 
0.26 
(0.62) 
-2.30*** 
(0.49) 
1.48*** 
(0.40) 
0.39 
(0.45) 
-1.85*** 
(0.49) 
0.57 
(0.42) 
0.08 
(0.93) 
 
Appendix H. Robustness check on different cutoff points 
 
 Cut off points +,- 1.96 Cut off points +,- 1.64 
Explanatory Var. Multinomial Logit 
Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
    Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  
Multinomial Logit Pr( 1)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=
   
Pr( 3)log( )
Pr( 2)
D
D
=
=  
Intercept 1.88 
(1.21) 
0.56 
(0.93) 
1.93* 
(1.13) 
0.72 
(1.04) 
Ag 0.29 
(0.41) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
0.36 
(0.41) 
-1.09** 
(0.29) 
Food 0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.44) 
0.75 
(0.41) 
-0.80* 
(0.46) 
Proxy_dummy -2.22*** 
(0.82) 
-2.09*** 
(0.85) 
-1.88*** 
(0.75) 
-1.47** 
(0.68) 
Proxy_count -2.27** 
(0.99) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
-2.13** 
(0.95) 
0.93 
(0.84) 
Proxy_freq -1.48** 
(0.75) 
-1.97*** 
(0.60) 
-1.24* 
(0.70) 
-1.72*** 
(0.72) 
Sample_centered 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
SPS_no_mrl -0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.40 
(0.40) 
-0.47 
(0.46) 
-0.42 
(0.43) 
TBT -0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
-0.05 
(0.55) 
-0.25 
(0.24) 
Agg_hs_centered -0.10 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
Panel_fix_time n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Panel_var_time 1.68** 
(0.76) 
-1.25 
(0.70) 
1.34** 
(0.73) 
-1.29** 
(0.56) 
Fix_country_pair -1.81** 
(0.83) 
0.17 
(0.62) 
-1.70** 
(0.80) 
0.24 
(0.66) 
Zero_treated 0.42 
(0.43) 
0.88** 
(0.37) 
0.31 
(0.42) 
0.93** 
(0.44) 
dev_SPS 1.03** 
(0.44) 
0.20 
(0.58) 
0.92** 
(0.40) 
-0.24 
(0.43) 
  
 
